Paraconsistent disjunctive deductive databases  by Subrahmanian, V.S.
Theoretical Computer Science 93 (1992) 1155141 
Elsevier 
115 
Paraconsistent disjunctive 
deductive databases 
V.S. Subrahmanian 
Department qf Computer Science, A.V. Williams Building. Universify of Maryland, College Park, 
Maryland 20742, USA 
Communicated by M Nivat 
Received July 1989 
Abstract 
VS. Subrahmanian, Paraconsistent disjunctive deductive databases, Theoretical Computer Science 
93 (1992) 115-141. 
Databases and knowledge bases could be inconsistent in many ways. The semantical characteriz- 
ation of deductive databases that contain disjunctive or indejiniinite nformation has been investigated 
by Minker and his co-workers (1982, 1987, 1988) and by Henschen and his co-workers (1985,1988). 
In both cases, there is one salient feature: the databases are assumed to consist of sentences of the 
form: A, v ... vA,+B1&.~~&B,, where each Ai and each B, is an atom and n>l. Thus, the 
database is~implicifly assumed to be consistent (it is easy to construct a model for any set of such 
formulas). What we study here is a method for reasoning about such databases when they are not 
necessarily consistent, Intuitively, this occurs when the Ats are restricted not just to atomic formulas, 
but also to negated atoms. We use the device of annotated atoms introduced by Blair and 
Subrahmanian (1987, 1988) to achieve this effect. Our semantics is closely related to the existing 
work of Newton da Costa (1974:1987), whose pioneering work on paraconsistency provides the 
semantical basis for our formal development. 
1. Motivation 
Often, given a piece of information, it is possible to conclude that either fact F1 or 
fact F2 is true. For instance, consider detective D who is investigating a murder. 
D concludes very quickly that there are exactly three people pr , p2, p3 who had the 
means, the opportunity, and the motive to kill victim u. Thus, based on preliminary 
investigations, D concludes that the murderer is either p1 or pz or p3. 
A few days later, based on certain results obtained from the forensic laboratory, it is 
determined that pl’s hand has powder burns (obtained when firing a gun) on it. This 
contradicts pr’s initial statement that he didn’t touch any gun, i.e. there is now an 
inconsistency in the existing evidence. 
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I must now disappoint mystery buffs. The existence of an inconsistency does not 
prevent the detective from drawing reasonable conclusions. He figures out immediately 
that pi is lying and, consequently, suspects him a bit more than p2 or p3. He does not 
immediately decide that p2 and p3 are murderers! There are three salient points here: 
(1) the detective is reasoning about a system that contains disjunctive information 
(“either p1 is the murderer or p2 is the murderer or p3 is the murderer”) 
(2) the detective reasons perfectly rationally despite the presence of an inconsist- 
ency (he suspects pl) 
(3) the detective does not draw arbitrary conclusions despite the existence of an 
inconsistency (he does not draw the unreasonable conclusion that p2 is the murderer). 
Thus, human beings have the ability to reason rationally even in situations that are 
inconsistent. This phenomenon deserves to be studied because inconsistencies can 
easily crop up in knowledge bases and/or deductive databases (see also [30]). 
Minker and his co-workers [26, 24, 28, 291 have extensively studied the theory of 
databases containing disjunctive information. Suppose a database consists of a finite 
set of disjunctive clauses, i.e. universally closed sentences of the form 
Al v .‘. v A, + B,&...&& (m>l). 
No set S of sentences of this form is ever inconsistent, because the interpretation that 
assigns true to all variable-free atoms in our underlying language is always a model of S. 
Others who have studied the problem of dealing with disjunctive databases include 
Henschen and his co-workers, [17, 341 who have developed elegant methods to 
handle queries to function-free disjunctive databases. However, they do not address 
the problem of reasoning in systems that are intuitively inconsistent. We do not 
require the restriction of function-freedom in this paper. 
In addition to allowing us to reason about inconsistencies, this paper may be 
viewed as providing an extension (to nonclassical lattice-based logic programming) of 
the theory of disjunctive logic programming developed by Minker et al. [28,29]. This 
framework also extends existing work on paraconsistent logic progamming due to 
Blair and Subrahmanian [4, 51 and independently due to Fitting [lo, 111, to accom- 
modate reasoning with disjunctive information. 
We quickly overview the organization of this paper. In Section 2, we introduce 
a family of logics. In Section 3, we describe the syntax and declarative semantics of 
disjunctive deductive databases. In Section 4, we develop a procedure for answering 
queries to such databases. In Section 5, we present an illustrative example that 
demonstrates how the framework presented in this paper can be used to reason about 
disjunctive databases that contain inconsistencies (in the intuitive sense). 
2. Syntax 
Suppose Y is a nonempty set of truth values. Constant symbols and variable 
symbols are terms. If f is an n-ary function symbol and t1 , . . . . t, are terms, then 
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f(ti ,..., t,) is a term. If p is an n-ary predicate symbol and tl ,..., t, are terms, then 
p(tl , . . . , t,) is an atom. If A is an atom, then A and 1 A are liter&. 
Definition 2.1. If A is an atom (literal) and PEG-, then A : p is an annotated atom 
(literal) over Y-. 
If e,, e, are syntactic first-order expressions (terms or atoms), then a substitution 
0 of variable symbols for terms is called a uni;fier of e, , e2 iff the application of 0 to e, 
(denoted by e, 0) yields the same expression as ez 0. A most general unifier (mgu) of 
any two syntactic expressions ei , e2 is a unifier 0 such that for any unifier d of the 
expressions e, , e2, there is a substitution y such that Oy= 0. If e, , e2 are unifiable 
terms or atoms, then they possess a most general unifier (cf. [23]). 
The intuitive reading of the atom A : p is: “It is believed that A’s truth value is at 
least p.” For example, the intuitive reading of A : true is: “It is believed that A’s truth 
value is at least true.” 
Definition 2.2. If L1 : pI, . . . . L,,:p,,, J1 : I/I~, . . . . J, : $,,, are annotated literals over Y, 
then 
J,:$, v ... v Jm:$m = L1:pl&...&L,:,uL, (m>l) 
is a disjunctive annotated clause over F. ( J1 : t+hl v ... v Jm: t,h,,,) is called the head of the 
above annotated clause, while (L, : pc, &...SzL, : ,un) is called the body. (We will often 
abuse terminology and refer to disjunctive annotated clauses as just clauses.) 
Definition 2.3. A disjunctive annotated logic program (DALP) over Y is a finite set of 
disjunctive annotated clauses over r. 
3. Semantics of disjunctive programs 
We assume that all interpretations have as their domain of interpretation the 
Herbrand base BP (the set of all variable-free atomic formulas of the language of P) of 
the DALP P under consideration. But first we explain the notion of satisfaction. We 
assume that ,Y is a complete lattice under an (as yet unspecified) ordering 6. The 
simplest lattice that we have in mind is the four-valued lattice FOUR due to Belnap 
[3] shown in Fig. 1. Intuitively, t and f represent the truth values “true” and “false”, 
respectively, of classical logic. The truth value I stands for “undefined” or “unknown” 
and is identical to the third truth value in Kleene’s three-valued logic. Likewise, the 
truth value T stands for “inconsistent with respect to the intuition of two-valued 
logic”. Note that within this FOUR-valued logic, we can reason consistently about 
theories that are inconsistent w.r.t. the intuitions of classical logic. 
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Fig. 1. The lattice FOUR. 
Thus, an interpretation I of a DALP P over Y may be considered to be a mapping 
I : BP + F. The < ordering is extended to interpretations in the natural way, i.e. 
The orderings 3, >, < are defined in the usual way. We also assume the existence 
of a function 1 : F+F. For the time being, there are no restrictions on 1. For 
example, if our lattice is the lattice FOUR, then one possibility is that 1 may be the 
function that maps t to f, f to t, _L to I and T to T. 
Definition 3.1. A formula is said to be closed iff it contains no free occurrences of any 
variable symbol. 
Definition 3.2. (Satisfaction). An interpretation I is said to satisfy 
(1) the formula F iff it satisfies the universal closure of F, 
(2) the variable-free annotated atom A:p iff I(A)2p, 
(3) the variable-free annotated literal (1 A):,u iff 1(,4)31(p) (iff 1+ A :l p),l 
(4) the variable-free formula F1 & F2 iff I satisfies F, and I satisfies F,, 
(5) the variable-free formula Vio,d fi iff I satisfies Fk for some k~_eZ (note that d is 
a possibly infinite set of indices ~ even though our language allows infinitary disjunc- 
tions, DALPs only contain finite ones), 
(6) the variable-free formula F1 e F2 iff either I satisfies F1 or I does not satisfy F1, 
(7) the variable-free formula F1eF2 iff I satisfies F1 eF2 and I satisfies Fz e F1, 
(8) the closed formula (3x) F iff there is some variable free term t such that I satisfies 
F [t/x], where F [t/x] denotes the result of replacing all free occurrences of x in F by t, 
(9) the closed formula (Vx)F iff for every variable free term t, I satisfies F [t/x]. 
Satisfaction is denoted by the symbol +. (We also use the symbol + to denote 
logical consequence. The intended meaning of I= is usually evident from the context in 
which it is used.) If F is a formula, we use the notation (3)F and (V)F to denote, 
1 Note here that the symbol 7 is being used in two ways: (1) as a syntactic object in our first-order 
language and (2) as a function of type .F+F-. 
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respectively, the existential and universal closure of F. Once F and 1 have been fixed, 
the above definition of satisfaction defines a logic. We call such logics annotated logics. 
Lemma 3.3. IfI is an interpretation, then II= (3)~ A :I( ifSZj= (3)A :i (p). 
The following theorem follows immediately from Lemma 3.3. 
Theorem 3.4. Suppose P is a DALP over Y. Let P’ be the DALP obtained from P by 
replacing all annotated literuls of the form 1 A : p by A : I (p). Then I is a model of P iff 
1 is a model of P’. 
Throughout the rest of this paper, we assume, without loss of generality, that 
DALPs contain no negated literals. 
Example 3.5. We show below a simple example that demonstrates how the lattice 
FOUR of truth values may be used to reason about systems that are inconsistent. 
Consider the following program EVEN: 
euen(O):tt, 
even((s(O))):f+, 
euen(s(s(X))):t + even(X):6 
even(s(s(X))):f + even(X):f. 
Clearly, EVEN has a model, namely, the interpretation that assigns t to all atoms of 
the form euen(s’(0)) for i even, and f to all atoms of the form even(s’(0)) for all odd j. 
Suppose now we create a program EVEN 1 by adding the following two clauses to the 
EVEN program: 
p:tc, 
p:ft. 
Intuitively, we are now told that p is true and also that p is false. Thus, intuitively, 
EVEN 1 is classically inconsistent, but our model-theoretic characterization yields 
four-valued models of EVEN 1. But we cannot use this to conclude even(s(0)): t; this 
sentence is not a logical consequence of EVEN 1 (w.r.t. our model-theoretic seman- 
tics), even though EVEN 1 intuitively contains an inconsistency (via the annotated 
clauses defining p). The semantics corresponds to our intuition because, intuitively, 
the definition of even has “nothing” to do with the definition of p. 
Theorem 3.6. Suppose P is a r-valued DALP and II 3 l2 3 l3 3 ... is a descending 
sequence of models of P. Then np 1 Ij is a model of P. 
Proof. Suppose I = ns 1 lj and 
A, :,uI v ... v A,:p, -= B,:Il/l&...&B,:&, 
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is a ground instance of a clause in P and 
z+(Br:$r&...& B,:$,). 
Hence, for all ja 1, 
ZjI= (B, : IC/,&“‘&B,: em), 
As each Zj is a model of P, for each j 3 1, there exists an integer denoted by cz( j) such 
that 1 <a(j)< k and Zj+ AUcj, : AL,. From this it follows that there is some 1 <i< k 
such that d = { j> 11 Zj I= Ai : cli} is infinite. Hence, 
Clearly, 
Hence, (nT> r Zj)(Ai)>pi, i.e. Z I= Ai: pi. Thus, Z is a model of the above clause. 0 
As the interpretation that assigns T to each ground atom is always a model of any 
DALP, Theorem 3.6 tells us that each DALP possesses at least one minimal model. 
However, in general, there may be more than one such model. 
4. Nonclassical model-state semantics 
First observe that if Y is a complete lattice under 6, then the set of Y-valued 
interpretations is also a complete lattice under the ordering < induced on interpreta- 
tions. In classical logic programming [23], given a family (Mi)iE.d of the models of 
a program P, nic.&Mi is also a model of P. It is well known that for disjunctive 
programs this property does not hold. In the nonclassical setting, we present an 
example to show that it does not hold either. 
Example 4.1. Suppose P is the FOUR-valued DALP shown below: 
p(a):t v p(b):fc 
P has twelve models as shown in Table 1. M = f-j;= 1 Mi is the interpretation that 
assigns I to each of p(u), p(b), which is clearly not a model of P. 
Table 1 
Atom M, M, M, M, M, M6 M, M, M, Ml0 Ml, Ml2 
p(a) t t t t T T T T 1 f I f 
p(b) 1 t f T 1 t f T f f T T 
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We generalize the idea of extended Herbrand base and model state due to Minker 
et al. [28]. 
Definition 4.2. A disjunction is a universally closed formula of the form 
A1:pl v ... v A,:y,, 
where each Ai is an atom and each ,u+F. (Recall that by Lemma 3.3, all negated 
annotated atoms can be replaced by positive annotated atoms without any lack of 
generality.) 
Definition 4.3. Suppose D is the Y-valued ground disjunction 
D,vAi:~livD,vAj:~jvD,, 
where D1, D,, D3 are ground disjunctions. If 
(1) Ai= Aj and 
(2) PidPj, 
then the ground disjunction D’ given by 
is a factor of D. Any factor of a factor of D is also a factor of D. A factor D” of D is 
called a proper factor iff D” is distinct from D. D is said to be factor free iff it has no 
proper factors. 
Clearly, if the ground disjunction D’ is a factor of the ground disjunction D, then D’ 
and D are logically equivalent, i.e. they have the same set of models. 
Definition 4.4. Suppose P is a F-valued DALP. Then the multivalued extended 
Herbrand Base, MVEHB(P) of P is defined as 
{(A, : pl v ... v A,, : p,) 1 n is some integer and each Ai is a ground atom in the 
language of P and each aide}. 
Intuitively, MVEHB(P) is the set of all finite disjunctions of ground annotated 
atoms that can be formed from the language of P. We use M VEHB, (P) to denote the 
set of all finite and infinitary disjunctions of ground atoms. 
Definition 4.5. Suppose D1 and D2 are the following disjunctions, respectively: 
A1:pl v ... v Ak:pk 
and 
B1 :pl v ... v B,:p,. 
Then D1 O-subsumes D2 iff 0 is a substitution such that 
(1) {A, 0 ,... A,O}c{B, ,..., B,} and 
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(2) for all 1 < i < k, there exists a 1 <j < m such that 
(a) pi>pj and 
(b) AiO=Bj. 
We say D, subsumes D2 iff there is a substitution 0 such that D1 O-subsumes D2. 
Example 4.6. Consider the set EV= {[pi, p2] 10<pl, p2 < 1 are real numbers} or- 
deredas:[~1,~Z]<[P1,P2]iff~1 <,p,and~~b,p,,where <,istheusualordering 
on the real numbers. (EV, <) is a complete lattice of truth values. In this case, a truth 
value is a pair of real numbers each of which lies in the [0, l] interval. Intuitively, the 
assignment of [pl, p2] to an atom A by an interpretation I may be taken as saying 
that the degree of belief in A is pL1 and the degree of disbelief in A is ,u2. As these 
degrees of belief/disbelief may be obtained in different ways, there is no relationship 
between pL1 and p2, e.g. we do not require that (cl1 +p2)< 1. Thus, an annotated atom 
is of the form A : [pl , p2], where A is an ordinary atom of classical logic, and pL1 and 
pLz are real numbers between 0 and 1. For instance, take D, , D2, D3 and D4 to be the 
following E I/-valued disjunctions, respectively: 
p(X): [0.2,0.7] v q(X): [0.3,0.2], (01) 
p(a) : [O.l, OS] v q(a) : [0.3,0.1] v r(a) : [0.9,0.7], (b) 
p(u): [0.2,0.7] v q(a): [0.3,0.25], (h) 
p(a): [0.2,0.7] v q(b): [0.3,0.2]. (04) 
Here D1 subsumes D2, but does not subsume either D3 or D4. In addition, D3 also 
subsumes D2. 
Proposition 4.7. Suppose D, D’ are disjunctions over F such that D subsumes D’. Then 
D+ D’, i.e. every model of D is a model of D’. 
Definition 4.8. Suppose P is a Y-valued DALP. An M V state S of P is any subset of 
MVEHB(P). An M V model state of P is an MV state S such that 
(1) if I is a minimal model of P, then I is a model of S and 
(2) each model of S is a model of P. 
(3) (disjunctive closure under entailment) Suppose 9 is any subset of S, and D is any 
(possibly infinitary) ground disjunction such that 9+ D. Then DES. 
Note that condition (3), the condition of disjunctive closure under entailment, is not 
required by Minker et al. PSI. However, this becomes necessary in the multivalued 
setting if we wish to obtain a property for MV model states that is analogous to the 
model intersection property in classical logic programming [23]. 
Example 4.9. Suppose we did not use condition (3) in the definition of MV model 
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state. Let P be the four-valued program shown below: 
p:t+-, 
p:fc. 
P has exactly one model, viz. the interpretation I such that I(p) = T. Then, clearly, if 
we exclude the disjunctive closure under entailment condition from the definition of 
MV model state, we could take 
Si={p:T} and S*={p:t,p:f} 
as MV model states. The sets Si and S, are logically equivalent. It can easily be 
verified that each of S, and S, satisfies conditions (1) and (2) of the definition of MV 
model state. Here, S1 nS2 =0, which clearly does not satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of 
MV model state. Thus, we seem to need the condition of disjunctive closure under 
entailment if we are to have any success in getting a model intersection like theorem. 
The set MS(P) of all MV model states of a DALP P may be ordered in many ways. 
In Proposition 4.12 we show that if our annotated logics possess a weak compactness 
property, then something definite can be said about the lattice structure (under 
inclusion) of the set of MV model states of a program. 
Definition 4.10 (Compactness properties). Suppose Y is a complete lattice of truth 
values and 9 is the annotated logic based on Y. 9’ is said to be 
(1) compact iff whenever T is a set of sentences in 9, and F is a formula such that 
T+ F, then there is a finite subset T’ of T such that T’/= F. 
(2) weakly compact iff whenever 9 is a set of ground disjunctions and D is 
a disjunction such that 91= D, then there is a finite subset 9’ of 9 such that 9’I= D. 
Note that arbitrary annotated logics may not possess even the weak compactness 
property. To see this, consider the following example. 
Example 4.11. Suppose we take as our set of truth values, the complete lattice ZNF 
shown in Fig. 3. Let 9 be the set 
{p:O, p: 1, p:2 )... }. 
Then 9 + p : co, but there is no finite subset 9’ of $9 such that 9’I= p: co. From this 
example, we learn that arbitrary annotated logics may not possess the weak compact- 
ness property. 
In classical logic, there are many alternative formalizations of the compactness 
theorem. One is similar to that of Definition 4.10, part (1). But in classical logic, this is 
equivalent to: “A set S of sentences has a model iff each finite subset S’ of S has 
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a model.” However, for annotated logics, the equivalence of these two definitions of 
compactness does not hold. To see this, in the preceding example, all finite subsets of 
9 have a model, as does 9 itself. Hence, 9 satisfies this definition of compactness, but 
not the one given in Definition 4.10, part (1). 
Later in this paper, we use our completeness theorem to prove that all finite-valued 
annotated logics are weakly compact. Below, we show that if logic 9 is weakly 
compact, then we know something about the lattice theory of MS(P). 
Proposition 4.12. Let P be any DALP over a set 5 of truth values (Here F need not be 
a complete lattice). Then 
If the annotated logic dp associated with F is weakly compact, then MS(P) is 
a complete lower semilattice. 
Proof. We need to show two things. First, that if (Si)iE,d (where d is some index set) is 
a subset of MS(P), then S = niE,dSi is in MS(P). The second thing to show is that if 
(Si)i,,, (where .d is some index set) is a directed subset of MS(P), then S’ = Ui~,d Si is in 
MS(P). 
I. We show that the intersection S of any family (Si)i,.d of MV model states of P is 
an MV model state of P. To see this, note that each minimal model Mmin of P is 
a model of each Si, for ~EJZ!. Hence, Mmin is a model of S = nit,& Si. Based on part (3) 
of the definition of MV model states, it is easy to verify that each model of ni,, Si is 
a model of some Sk, kE&. We now need only to check the property of disjunctive 
closure under entailment. Suppose 9 s n_, Si and G.@l= D. Then, as 9 G Si for all 
ied and as each Si is an MV model state, it follows that DESK for all iEd. Hence, 
DEf%E.OISi. 
II. Suppose S’= uiE_&Ssi where (Si)i_, is a directed subset of MS(P). Clearly, S’ 
satisfies conditions (1) and (2) in the definition of MV model state. We only need to 
check that the condition of disjunctive closure under entailment holds. Suppose 
9 E S’ is such that for some ground disjunction D, 91 D. Then, as 9 is weakly 
compact, there is some finite subset 9” of 9 satisfying the condition 9’I= D. As 
a consequence, there is a finite subset d’ G .d such that 9’ G U,_,,Sl. As (Si)i,.d is 
a directed subset of MS(P) and as d’ is a finite subset of d, there is an C(E& such that 
S, Z u Si 
iC.d’ 
As S, is an MV model state of P and as 9 G S, and as % /= D, it follows from part (3) 
of the definition of MV model state that DES,. Hence, as a~.&, 
DEIJSi. 0 
ie.d 
In general, MS(P) will not form a complete lattice. This is because part II of the 
proof of Proposition 4.12 explicitly uses the fact that (Si)i,.d is directed. Intuitively too, 
it should be obvious that MS(P) may not be a complete lattice because S, US, may 
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entail D even though neither S1 nor S2 entail D. This problem does not arise in the 
initial work of Minker and Rajasekar [28] because they do not consider disjunctions 
of arbitrary literals. Here we do not restrict our attention to atoms only. For instance, 
in the lattice FOUR of truth values, p : f means the same thing, intuitively, as 1 p does 
in classical logic. In the sequel, we assume that all the logics considered in this paper 
are weakly compact, and that only finite disjunctions are considered hereafter. 
As any complete lower semilattice has a least element, any DALP whose associated 
annotated logic is weakly compact has a least MV model state. We denote this least 
model state by S$. (Compare Proposition 4.12 with Theorem 2 of Minker et al. [28].) 
The following result is easy to derive. 
Lemma 4.13. Let P be a Y-valued logic program where Y is a complete lattice of truth 
values. We use grd( P) to denote the set of all ground instances of clauses in P. Then 
SC=S;,*(P,. (The fact that grd(P) may be infinite is irrelevant.) 
Example 4.14. Note that the complete lattice TWO in our formulation does not lead 
to the same semantics as that of classical logic. Figure 2 shows the complete lattice 
TWO. 
According to the definition of satisfaction in our paper, the TWO-valued interpreta- 
tion I that assigns t to an atom A satisfies A : f which is clearly not the intent of 
classical logic. Classical logic, clearly, cannot be subsumed by our proposal because it 
does not allow reasoning in the presence of inconsistency, while our proposal does 
allow that. 
Minker et al. [28, Theorem 21 show that in classical disjunctive logic programs, if 
D is a disjunction such that PI= D, then there is a disjunction D’ in the least model 
state of P such that D’ subsumes D. Example 4.9 clearly shows us that if we directly 
attempt to use the definition of model state given by Minker et al. [28], this property 
does not hold in the context of this paper. However, under our definition, we are able 
to obtain the following related result. 
Theorem 4.15. Suppose P is a Y-valued DALP and D is a ground disjunction. Then 
P+ D ifsDES$. 
t 
f 
Fig. 2. The complete lattice TWO. 
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Proof. Let Dz(A,:pi v ... v &:P~). 
(e): Immediate consequence of part (1) of the definition of MV model state. 
(a): Suppose P+ D. Let (Mi)iE.c9 be the set of minimal models of P. The theorem 
follows from two observations: 
l (Observation 1) the minimal models of P and the minimal models of S”, coincide. 
This follows from Parts (1) and (2) of Definition 4.8. 
l (Observation 2) If I1 and I2 are interpretations such that I1 d I*, then for any 
disjunction DEMVEHB(P) such that I1 l= D, it is also the case that Iz I= D. 
As PI= D, all models of P and, in particular, all minimal models of P satisfy D. 
Therefore, by Observation 1, all minimal models of S$ satisfy D. By Observation 
2 above, all models of S’, satisfy D, i.e. $I= D. As we are considering only Herbrand 
models here, we know that I is an Herbrand model of P iff I is an Herbrand model of 
grd(P) where grd(P) = {C 1 C is a ground instance of a clause in P}. Hence, by Part (3) 
of Definition 4.8, it follows that DES&,(~). By Lemma 4.13, it follows that 
DES:,. 0 
We now define an operator that maps MV model states to MV model states. 
Intuitively, given a DALP P, if we know that certain disjunctions of annotated atoms 
are satisfied by the MV model state in question, then the operator tells us which 
disjunctions can be inferred (in one step) from the input MV model state and the 
information contained in the DALP. 
Definition 4.16. Suppose F is a complete lattice of truth values and P is a F-valued 
DALP. We define the operator Cn, . ~~((MVEHB(P))-+~((MVEHB(P)) as follows: 
Cn,(X)={DEMVEHB(P)jXI= D}. 
Thus, for example, given an annotated ground atom A :I*, Cn, ({A :p})= 
{A:$ v DIp’<p and D is any disjunction in MVEHB(P)}. 
Definition 4.17. Suppose P is a F-valued DALP. Then we associate an operator Tp 
that maps states to states (not necessarily model states) as follows: 
T,(S)=Cn,({DID’+-B 1 : t,bl & ‘..&B,: +bn is a ground instance of a disjunc- 
tive annotated clause in P and D1 v B1:~l,...,D,~ B,:&, 
are all in S and for all l<i<n, rc/i<&i and 
D” = D’ v D1 v “’ v D, and D” subsumes the ground 
disjunction D}). 
In the above all syntactic expressions represented by the meta-variables 
D, D’, D”, Di are all ground disjunctions. 
Intuitively, the operator Cn, is one that takes a set X of disjunctions as input and 
returns the set of all ground disjunctions that are logical consequences of X as output. 
Ordinarily, one would have thought that there is no need to apply this operator in 
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Definition 4.17. However, the problem is that we may be able to use T, (defined 
without an application of Cn,) on some set, but we may not be able to take LUBs. 
For example, we might have p : t and p : f as unit disjuncts in Tp(S) for some S relative 
to the logic based on FOUR, but we may not have p: T in T,(S). The following 
example demonstrates how T, works. 
Example 4.18. Let P be the FOUR-valued program shown below: 
p:fe. 
Let X G M VEHB(P) be the empty set. Then 
TP(X)=Cn.({p:t,p:f,p:T})=Cn.({p:T}). 
Note that p: T is in T,(X) because p: t and f are in Tp(X) and because p: T is 
a disjunctive consequence of p : t and p : f. 
Note 4.19. Cn, is monotonic, i.e. if X1 G X,, then Cn, (XI) c Cn, (X,). 
Proposition 4.20. Suppose P is a r-valued DALP. Then Tp is monotone, i.e. ifs, and S2 
are M V model states such that S1 c S2, then Tp(S1) E Tp(S2). 
Proof. Suppose S1 E S2 and E is a disjunction in T,(S,). For i= 1, 2, let 
Xi={DID’tB,:~,& . ..&B.: $,, is a ground instance of a disjunctive annotated 
ClauseinPandD, v B,:4,, . . . . D,vB,:~,areallinSiand$i~~iforalll~i~nand 
D”=D’ v D 
1 
v . . . v D, and D” subsumes the ground disjunction D}. Then there are 
two possibilities. Either E is in X, or E is in Cn, (X,)-X,. We show that if E is in 
X1, then E is in Xz. It follows from this, using the monotonicity of Cn, , that 
Tp(SI) c T,(S,). Hence, we need only consider this case. So, assume E is in X1. Then 
there is a clause in P of the form D’ c B1 : $1 & ... & B, : t,b, such that S, contains 
formulas of the form D1 v B1 : $1, . . . , Dn~B,:$n and Ic/i~~i for all l<i<n and 
D”=D’ v D1 v . . . v D, and D” subsumes the ground disjunction E. As S1 E Sz, it 
follows now that Sz contains the formulas D, v B1 : c#I~, . . ., D, v B,: &. Hence, 
EET,(S,). 0 
The operator of Minker and Rajasekar [28] is continuous. Unfortunately, our Tp 
operator may fail to be continuous. 
Example 4.21. Let Y be the complete lattice INF shown in Fig. 3. Let P be the 
INF-valued DALP consisting of the single annotated clause 
q:w+p:e, 
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0 
Fig. 3. The complete lattice INF. 
and let D be the directed set of interpretations (I,, II ,. . . } such that I,,(P)= n and 
I,,(q)=O. Then for all n, T,(l,,)(q)=O. Hence, 
But 
UI,(p)=ar,>e. 
n 
Hence, 
Therefore, Tp is not continuous. 
Despite the fact that Tp may not always be continuous, we do have the following 
result which tells us that Tp has w as its closure ordinal. 
Definition 4.22. We define the upward iteration of Tp as follows: 
TpTO={i(Ai:i)i n any integer and AiEB~ 
I 
. 
Tp~u=Tp(Tp~(c(-l)) if CI is a successor ordinal. 
if A is a limit ordinal. 
Theorem 4.23. Suppose P is a F-valued DALP. Then lfp( T,) = T, 7 o, where lfp( T,) 
denotes the least fixed point of Tp. 
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Proof. By the monotonicity of T,, we already know that T, 70 G lfp( Tr). Hence, if 
we show that Trf(~ + 1) G TJo, then we will be done. Suppose now that this is not 
true, i.e. that there is some ground disjunction E such that EE Tr 7 (a~ + 1) - Trr o. We 
derive a contradiction. 
As E~T~f(u+l), EECn,({DID’tB1:~I&...&B,:~, is a ground instance of 
a disjunctive annotated clause in P and D, v B1 : 4 1,. . . , D, v B, : 4” are all in Trt w 
and lcli < 4i for all 1 <i < n and D” = D’ v D1 v ... v D, and D’ subsumes the ground 
disjunction D}). As the (Di v &: aims are in Trt w, for each 1~ i< n, there is an integer 
denoted by CC(~) such that (Oi v Bi:~i) is in Trf(cr(i)). Let a=max{a(l),...,cr(n)}. 
Then, as Tr is monotonic, all the (Di v Bi : & )‘s are in Tr t c(. CI is an integer; hence, so is 
(a + 1). But now it follows from the definition of Tr that E is in Trt(~ + 1). Hence, E is 
in Trto. This contradicts our earlier assumption that EETrt(w+ l)- Trt o. 0 
The above theorem tells us that despite Tr’s lack of continuity, w is still the closure 
ordinal of Tr. The following lemma is easy to establish. 
Lemma 4.24. Suppose P is a F-valued DALP and D= AI : pl v ... v A,: p, is 
a ground disjunction such that P k D. Then there are$nitely many clauses C, , . . . , Ck in 
grd(P) such that for some 1~ i<m, the following condition holds: 
U{pIAi:p occurs in the head ofsome Cj, l<j<k}>pi. 
Lemma 4.25. Suppose P is a DALP and S is an M V model state of P. Then Tr(S) E S. 
Proof. Suppose CgT,(S). Then CECn,(X), where X is the set {C’(C”tBi&...&B, 
is a ground instance of a clause in P and there are ground disjunctions D1,. . . , D, such 
that for all 1 <i<n, (Bi v Di)ES and C”‘=(C” v D1 v ... v D,) subsumes C’}. There 
are two possibilities. 
Case I (CeX): Then there is a ground instance CO of a clause in P such that CO is of 
the form 
and there are ground disjunctions D1 ,. , D, such that for all 1 d id n, (Bi v Di)~S and 
C”‘=(C” v D1 v . . . v D,) subsumes C. As S is an MV model state, Sk CO and, hence, 
SI= C”‘. As C”’ subsumes C and by the condition of disjunctive closure under 
entailment on S, CES. 
Case 2 (C&n, (X),): In this case, the result follows immediately from the dis- 
junctive closure under entailment condition. 0 
Theorem 4.26. (Soundness and completeness of fixed-point construction). Suppose 
P is a F-valued DALP, where F is a complete lattice and D is a ground disjunction. 
Then lfp(Tr)=S$=Trfo. 
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Proof. We already know that Tp To = lfp( T,). 
Ifp(Tp)~Srp:Suppo~eE-A1:~(lv... v A, : ,& is in T, 7 co. Then we want to show 
that EES$. As EeTpfw, there is an integer n such that T,tn(= E. We proceed by 
induction on n. 
Base Case (n=O): Then each pi is equal to 1. Also, the empty set of disjunctions 
entails E. As S’, is an MV model state and, hence, closed under disjunctive entailment, 
it follows that E is in S’,. 
Inductive Case (n + 1): Suppose EE Tp t(n + 1). Now, Tp t(n + 1) = Cn v (X,), where 
X, is the set {DID’ +B,:$,&...&B,:$, is a ground instance of a disjunctive 
annotatedclauseinPandD,vB,:~,,...,D,~B,:~,areallinT,rnandll/~~~~for 
all 1 did m and D” = D’ v D1 v ... v D, and D” subsumes the ground disjunction D}. 
Thus, either EEX, or EECn, (X,)-X,. 
Subcase 1 (EEX,): Then there is a clause in P having a ground instance of the form 
D’cB1:$,&...&B,:$,suchthatD, v B,:4 1, . . ..D.vB,:&,areallinT,fnand 
Sinai for all l<i<m and D”=D’v D, v ... v D, and D” subsumes the ground 
disjunction E. By the induction hypothesis, for all 1 didm (Di v Bi: pi) is in 
S’,. As S’, is an MV model state of P, the minimal models of S$ and P coincide. Let 
I be any model of S$. As S$ is an MV model state, I is a model of P. Hence, for all 
1 d i < m, Z+ (Di v Bi : pi). AS $i d 4i, it follows that I + (Di v Bi: It/i). Hence, as I is 
a model of P, it follows that I is a model of D” and, hence, of E. Therefore, 
S/,1= D”. As S$ is an MV model state and, therefore, satisfies the disjunctive closure 
under entailment condition, D”ES ‘p. As D” subsumes E, it now follows (by another 
application of the condition of disjunctive closure under entailment) that EE$. 
S$ c Efp( T,): For this, it suffices, by virtue of the monotonicity of T, and Lemma 
4.25, to show that Ifp(T,) is an MV model state. This follows by a straightforward 
verification of the three conditions in the definition of MV model state. 0 
5. Operational aspects 
In this section, we show how to answer queries to DALPs. In general logic 
programming as described in [23], we encounter problems when attempting to 
answer queries. For instance, p is a logical consequence of the program 
P + P> 
P+-4> 
p-14. 
But no version of SLD resolution and/or SLDNF resolution that I am aware of 
yields a “yes” response to the query p. However, if we consider the FOUR-valued 
program 
p:t+--p:t, 
p:ttq:t, 
p:ttq:f, 
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then p : t is not a logical consequence of this program according to the model-theoretic 
semantics described in Section 3. The interpretation I that assigns I to both p and 4 is 
a model of this program which does not satisfy p: t. 
The preceding example with FOUR as our truth value lattice shows that there is an 
intuitionistic flavour to our declarative semantics. Because of this, it is possible to 
obtain a query processing procedure similar to SLO resolution due to Minker et al. 
[28] that is sound and complete w.r.t. existential queries to DALPs. 
Definition 5.1. If Di, . ., D, are disjunctions, then (3)(D, &...&D,) is an existential 
query. 
Definition 5.2. Suppose P is a F-valued DALP (resp. X is a possibly infinite set of 
disjunctive annotated clauses). Then an MVD-derivation (MVD stands for “multi- 
valued disjunctive”) of the existential query Q. from P (resp. X) is a sequence 
<Qo,Dc,, Co, ‘A,),..., <Qn,Dn, C,, ‘A,>,... 
satisfying the following conditions: 
(1) Di is a disjunction occurring in Qi, 
(2) Ci+B1:p1&‘..&Bk:pk is a clause in P (resp. X), 
(3) Ci 0i-subsumes Di, and 
(4) if Qi is the query 
(3)(E,&...&E,) 
(where each Ei is a disjunction) and Di= Ej, then Qi+ 1 is the query 
(3)[E,&...&Ej_,&(B1 :iu1 V Di)&...&(Bk:~k V Di)&Ej+l&..‘&E,]Bi. 
Definition 5.3. An MVD derivation 
<Qo, Do, Co, &>, . ..i (Qn, D,, C,, ‘J,> 
of the query Q. from the F-valued DALP P (the possibly infinite set X of disjunctive 
annotated clauses) is said to be an M VD refutation of Q. iff Qn+ 1 is the empty query, 
denoted by q . The length of this MVD refutation is n. 
Theorem 5.4 (Soundness). Suppose P is a Y-valued DALP and Q. is an existential 
query that has an M VD refutation from P. Then P(= Qo. 
Proof. Let Q. = (3 ) (D I 8~‘. . &D,), where each Di is a disjunction. Let 
<Qo,E,> Co> 4,>> . . . . (Qn>E,, G,&> 
be the MVD refutation of Qo. We proceed to show, by induction on n, that 
P)=(V)Q,&,...&. 
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Base Case (n = 0): In this case, the MVD resolvent of Q. and Co is the empty query. 
This means that r= 1 and that Co has an empty body. Co is of the form 
and CL 80-subsumes Dr. As PI= (V) Cb, we know that P+ (V) CL Q0 and, hence, as 
Cb &-subsumes Di, PI= (V)Dl O,,. This completes the argument. 
Inductive case (n > 1): In this case, 
(Ql,E,, CI, OI),..., (Qn,E,, G,R> 
is an MVD refutation of Q 1 Hence, by the induction hypothesis, we may assume that 
P+(V)Q,W, where 0’=0i...O,. Q1 is of the form 
(3)[D,&“‘&Dj_l&(B1:~1 V Dj)&..‘&(B,:Clk V Dj)&Dj+,&‘.‘&D,]B,, 
where Dj= El. Here we have taken Co to be 
C; + B1:~l&...&Bk:~k. 
As P+ (V)Q1 8’, we know that 
P+(V)((B,:/A~ V Dj)&...&(B,:pk V Dj))d’. 
In particular, 
Pk (V)((B, :,LL~ V Dj)&...&(Bk:pk V Dj))808’. 
As Co t!?,-subsumes Dj, it follows now that P(=(V)(Dj8,)@. Hence, as 
P~(V)(D1&...&Dj_l&Dj+,&...&D,)Bo8’, 
it follows that Pl=(V)(D,&...&D,)B,8’. This completes the proof. 0 
Unfortunately, this procedure of MVD refutation is not, in general, complete. To 
see this consider the following simple FOUR-valued program. 
Example 5.5. Let P be the FOUR-valued program below: 
p:tt, 
p:ft. 
Then p: T is a logical consequence of P, but there is no MVD refutation of p: T from 
P because condition (3) in the definition of MVD derivation is never satisfied (neither 
p:t nor p:f subsumes p:T). 
Definition 5.6. A disjunctive annotated clause C + Body is said to be covered iff every 
variable symbol that occurs in Body also occurs in C. A DALP P is said to be covered 
iff each disjunctive annotated clause in P is covered. 
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In the sequel, we assume that the annotation I does not occur anywhere in 
a program or query. It is easy to verify that there is no loss of generality in making this 
assumption. If A : I occurs as the single literal in the head of a clause in a DALP, then 
that clause can be deleted; the resulting DALP will be logically equivalent to the 
original DALP. Likewise, if A : I occurs in the disjunctive head of a DALP, then it can 
simply be deleted from the disjunctive head; if it occurs in the body of a clause, then 
again, it can be deleted from the body; in both cases, logical equivalence is preserved. 
Theorem 5.7 (Completeness). Suppose P is a covered F-valued DALP. Then there is 
a set X of disjunctive annotated clauses such that 
(1) PGX, 
(2) if there is an M VD derivation of the query Q from P, then there is an M VD 
derivation of Q from X, (i.e. MVD refutation w.r.t. X is sound w.r.t. DALP P), and 
(3) if Q is a ground query such that PI= Q, then there is an M VD refutation of Q from 
X (i.e. MVD refutation w.r.t. X is complete w.r.t. DALP P). 
Proof. Suppose Ci, C2 are two clauses (we assume they are standardized apart) in 
X such that the following two conditions are satisfied: 
(Ml) there is a disjunction D such that {C, , C,} j= D, and 
(M2) D is not subsumed by either the head of C1 or the head of CZ. 
Then define the mutant, _k’(C1, C,) to be the set of clauses of the form 
D + Body 1 & Body 2, 
where Body1 and Body2 are the bodies of clauses C1, C2, respectively, and D satisfies 
conditions (Ml) and (M2) above. Now define an operator dcl which maps (possibly 
infinite) sets of disjunctive annotated clauses to (possibly infinite) sets of disjunctive 
annotated clauses as follows: 
deI(X)=U(&C,, Cz)lCi, C2 are disjunctive annotated clauses in X and 
C1, CZ satisfy conditions (Ml) and (M2) and Jz’(Ci, C,) is not 
subsumption equivalent to any clause in X}. 
Now define the full disjunctive closure, fdcl(P) of the DALP P as follows: 
fdcl,(P)=dcl(P), 
fdel,+,(P)=dCl(fdeli(P)), 
fdcl(P)= u fdcli(P). 
i>O 
The theorem now follows from the following observations: 
(1) T,= Trde,(P). (Even though fdcl(P) may contain infinitely many clauses, the 
definition of the Tfdc,(p) is essentially the same as that in Definition 4.17.) As a conse- 
quence of this fact, it follows that MVD refutations using clauses in dcl(P) are sound 
w.r.t. P. 
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(2) Suppose Q. = D1 &..‘&Dk is a ground query, where each Di is a disjunction of 
annotated literals. If P+ Qo, then for each 1 d i < k, there is a clause Ci in fdcl(P) such 
that the head of Ci subsumes Di and such that the body of Ci is in S$. 
(3) Tfdcl(P) Trn satisfies Q. for some integer m. 
We may now proceed by induction on m. 
Base Case (m = 0): Then, for each 1 < i < k, there is a clause, denoted by Ci, in fdcl(P) 
having a ground instance of the form 
such that Ci s-subsumes Di and TpyOl= (Bi:IC/i v Ei:+i) for all 1 < ibr (E denotes the 
empty substitution). Here the Ei: ~i’s are some disjunctions in MVEHB(P). As 
P contains no atoms annotated with I, and as T,yO contains only atoms annotated 
with I, it follows that r=O. Hence, as Q. is ground, 
((D,&...&&),D,, CI, ~),((&&...&4), D,,CZ,E),..., (&,D~c,ck, E) 
is an MVD refutation of Qo. 
Inductive Case: Suppose TPt (m + 1) I= Q. Then, for each 16 id k, there is a ground 
instance Ci of a clause in fdcl(P) of the form 
such that C; is Di and for all 16 i < k and all 1 <j < Si, there is an Ef in M VEHB (P) 
such that (B::IC/i v Ej) is in TPtn. 
As P is covered, fdcl(P) is also covered and, hence, the Bj’s are all ground. Hence, 
by the induction hypothesis, for each (Bj:rC/j v Ej), there is an MVD refutation, 
denoted %: from fdcl(P). As all the queries in these refutations are ground, we may 
combine these MVD refutations into an MVD refutation 
% is an MVD refutation of the query Q’ obtained by conjoining MVD refutations of 
all the (Bi:$i v Ej)‘s. 
We may now construct an MVD refutation of Q. as follows. Resolve Q. against Co 
on Do to get query 3i. Now resolve 3i against C1 on D, to get &. Repeat this process 
till we resolve 3,+ against Ck on Dk. The MVD resolvent obtained at this point is the 
query Q’. This query has an MVD refutation, viz. !R. 0 
We give below a quick example to demonstrate how MVD derivations work. 
Example 5.8. Let P be the FOUR-valued DALP given below: 
Cl: p:t v q:ft, 
c2: r:t+p:t, 
c3: r:ttq:f. 
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r:t 
I 
@:tvr:t) 
I 
(p:tvr:tvq:t) 
I 
m 
(Initial Query) 
(by C2) 
(by C3) 
(by Cl) 
Fig. 4. MVD refutation. 
Figure 4 shows an MVD refutation of the query r: t. 
Definition 5.9. A set S of disjunctive annotated clauses (w.r.t. the set 5 of truth values) 
is said to have the Jinite head annotation property (FHA property) iff the set {P//J is 
the annotation of an atom in the head of a clause in S} is finite. 
As DALPs are finite, they all possess the FHA property. Moreover, it is easy to 
verify that if P is a DALP, then grd(P) also possesses the FHA property. Two 
compactness related results follow from the completeness theorem. 
Corollary 5.10. Suppose F is any complete lattice of truth values and T is any set of 
1 -free disjunctive annotated clauses (not necessarily a DALP) with the FHA property. 
Then: “If D is any disjunction such that T+ D, then there is a$nite subset T’ of T such 
that T’I= D.” 
The proof of the above “compactness’ corollary is due to the completeness theorem. 
The following result is also a consequence of the completeness theorem. 
Corollary 5.11. Suppose F is anyfinite complete lattice of truth oalues and T is any set 
of disjunctive annotated clauses. Then: “lf D is any disjunction such that T/= D, then 
there is ajinite subset T’ of T such that T’+ D.” 
6. Illustrative Example 
In this section, we present a toy example showing how inconsistencies may arise in 
the construction of disjunctive knowledge bases by consulting many different domain 
experts, 
Consider the construction of a medical expert system by consulting two doctors 
DOCl and DOCz . The expert system is aimed primarily at diagnosing two diseases d, 
and d2. The intended usage of this expert system is as follows: 
l The “core” part of the expert system is the knowledge (mainly in the form of 
nonunit clauses) provided by doctors DOCl and DOCz. 
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l When we intend to apply this knowledge to a specific patient, say Ann, then the 
pathologists, X-ray technicians, etc. who conduct medical tests on Ann add the 
results of these tests to the knowledge base. 
l In real life, such a system would work by keeping the main knowledge base 
described above in one or more files, while each patient’s records are maintained in 
a separate file (or possibly as a record in a given file). Then the main knowledge base 
and this file (or record as the case may be) are merged together to form a “current” 
knowledge base, and used to diagnose the patient’s disease. More information on 
dynamic knowledge base maintenance is described in [18, 21. This subject is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
We assume that our expert system is written in the form of a DALP over FOUR. 
Suppose now that DOCl provides us the following three rules. (In the sequel, think of 
the si)s as representing symptoms.) 
Cl: &(X):t v &(X):f e sl(X):t&s,(X):f, 
c2: d1(X):f c= &(X):t, 
c3: d,(X):f = dl(X):t. 
Intuitively, this doctor has told us that if an individual is tested positive for 
symptom s1 and negative for s2, then he either has disease d, or disease d2. Further- 
more, he goes on to say that no individual can have both diseases d, and d2 at the 
same time. 
Now let us consider what doctor DOC2 has told us. He tells us that if test s2 is 
positive and test s3 is negative, then the patient has disease d, for sure. He also tells us 
that if test sj is negative, then there is no way the patient could have disease d2. These 
two rules are captured by: 
c4: dl(X):t t s2(X):f&s3(X):f, 
C5: d2(X):f+s3(X):f. 
Now the pathologist who has examined the patients Ann and Lisa tells us the 
following test results: 
C6: s,(ann):tt, 
c7: s,(lisa):t+, 
C8: s,(ann):fc, 
c9: s2(lisa):ft, 
ClO: sj(ann):tc 
The pathologist’s report above tells us that Ann was tested positive for symptoms s1 
and s3, and negative for s2. Lisa was tested positive for s1 and negative for s3; 
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however, the test results for s2 were inconclusive in Lisa’s case (such phenomena are 
common in medicine and for that matter in many of the experimental sciences). 
Based on these test results, we are able to use the medical expertise provided by 
DOCl and DOC2 to conclude that 
(1) Ann has disease dl, but not d2. It is easy to verify that d1 (ann):t is in 
S$ (here P is the DALP obtained by taking the union of the three subprograms listed 
above). An MVD refutation of the query d1 (arm): t is shown in Fig. 5. Similarly, 
dz(ann):f is in S$. An MVD refutation of d,(ann):f is shown in Fig. 6. 
(2) Lisa either has disease d, or d2. Even though neither dl (ha): t nor d2 (ha): t is 
in S$, d,(lisa):t v d,(lisu):t is in S$. 
So far, everything has been consistent. Suppose now that a third doctor DOC3 had 
given us information that 
c 11: d,(X):t+s,(X):t. 
Let us call the DALP obtained by taking the rules provided by all three doctors and 
the pathologist’s data Q. In that case, we would be in the grips of an inconsistency 
because we could use DOC3’s rule and the pathologist’s data to conclude that Ann has 
disease d2. Likewise, we could use the rule provided by DOC2 and the pathologist’s 
data to conclude that Ann has disease d, . This contradicts DOCl’s rules that say that 
no patient can have both diseases dl and dZ. Thus, when we include rule (Cl 1) in our 
knowledge base, we can infer dl(unn):T. An MVD refutation of this query which 
explicitly uses clauses from fdcl(P) is shown in Fig. 7. Note however that the existence 
of this inconsistency does not allow us to draw arbitrary conclusions, e.g. we are not 
able to conclude that Lisa has disease d, 
dl(ann) : t 
I 
(Initial Query) 
(dl(ann) : t v q_(ann) : f) & 
(by C4) 
(dl(ann) : t v sg(ann) : t) 
I 
(dl(ann) : t v s3(ann) : t) 
(by C8) 
I (by Cl@ 
m 
Fig. 5. MVD refutation of d, (ann): t. 
dz(ann) : f 
I 
(d?(ann) : f v dl(ann) : t) 
I 
(Initial Query) 
(by C3) 
(q(ann) : f v d2(ann) : f v dl(ann) : f) & 
(by C5) 
(ss(ann) : t v d2 (arm) : f v dl(ann) : t) 
I 
(q(ann) : t v dz(ann) : f v dl (arm) : t) 
(by C8) 
I (by Cl01 
0 
Fig. 6. MVD refutation of d2(ann):f. 
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dl(unn) :T 
I 
(Initial Query) 
(By resolving with the 
(dl(unn) :T v dz(unn) : t) & mutant of (C2),(C4)) 
(dl(unn) :T v q(unn) : f) & 
(dl(ann) :T v s&nn) : t) 
I (using ((3)) 
(dl(unn) :T v dz(unn) : t) & 
(dl(unn) :T v sg(unn) : t) 
t (using ((30)) 
(dl(unn) :T v dz(unn) : t) 
I (using (Cl 1)) 
(dl(unn) :T v dz(unn) : t v ss(unn) : t) 
I (using (ClO)) 
0 
Fig. 7. MVD refutation of d, (arm): T using (Cl)-(Cl 1) 
Before concluding, we briefly compare our work with the existing related work. In 
[4, 51, Blair and Subrahmanian have presented a framework for paraconsistent logic 
programming. However, their framework does not allow disjunctions to occur in the 
heads of clauses. Conversely, Minker and his co-workers [28, 241 and Henschen and 
his co-workers [17,34] have studied the theory of disjunctive databases. In both cases, 
negations are not allowed to appear in the heads of clauses and, therefore, all such 
databases are assumed to be consistent. The framework presented here does not make 
this assumption. A similar comment applies to the work of Ross and Topor [31]. In 
[21], Kifer and Lozinskii study annotated logic programs, and extend the theory to 
a full fledged annotated logic (see also [20]). However, they do not develop any 
fixed-point theory for disjunctive theories. They are largely concerned with the issue of 
identifying the cause (causes) of the inconsistency (inconsistencies) and then removing 
these causes. We do not address this issue here. Ioannidis and Sellis [19] are also 
concerned with a similar issue, viz. that of resolving conflicts in databases. They do 
not develop a formal theoretical basis for conflict resolution. Fitting [lo-133, in 
parallel with the original work on paraconsistent logic programming [4], also de- 
veloped a four-valued semantics for logic programs. Fitting’s framework does not 
allow either negations or disjunctions to occur in the heads of clauses, and as 
a consequence, his framework captures a logic of consensus rather than a logic of 
inconsistency. However, he allows clause bodies to contain certain special connectives 
_ our framework does not allow this. 
7. Conclusions 
Here we have developed a theory of disjunctive logic programming with negations 
allowed to appear both in the head of a clause and in the body. As such programs can 
easily contain inconsistent information (with respect to the intuitions of two-valued 
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logic), this means that our formalism allows us to reason about systems that 
are intuitively inconsistent, but yet have models (in our nonclassical model 
theory). Such an ability is important because inconsistencies may occur very 
easily during the design and development of deductive databases and/or expert 
systems. 
Blair and Subrahmanian [4], using some ideas inherent in earlier works by Arruda 
[l] and Newton da Costa [6-91, developed a framework for logic programming based 
on such a nonclassical set of truth values. However, the initial Blair-Subrahmanian 
framework [4] was applicable only to deductive databases that contained no disjunc- 
tive information. 
However, disjunctive information occurs frequently in everyday life. Often, we 
know that one of the two things is true without knowing which of them is actually 
true. That such situations can easily arise during the design of deductive databases is 
easily seen from the example in Section 6. 
In this paper, we have developed a theory of disjunctive deductive databases that 
(perhaps) contain inconsistent information. We have shown how to associate, with 
any such database, an operator that maps MV model states to MV model states. It is 
shown that this operator has a least fixed point which is identical to the set of all 
variable-free disjunctions that are provable from the database under consideration. 
We then devise a procedure to answer queries to such databases. Soundness and 
completeness results are proved. 
The techniques introduced in this paper are fairly general. We believe that ordinary 
databases would be based on the lattice FOUR of truth values. However, the results 
described here are applicable to databases that are quantitative in nature. This 
is a consequence of the fact that the set Y of truth values is any complete lattice. 
Thus, rather than take our set of truth values to be FOUR, we may take it to be, say 
[0, l] x [0, 11. In this situation, a truth value is a pair [pi, p2] of real numbers in the 
unit interval. The truth values may be ordered as [pl, p2] d [pl, p2] iff ,ui <pi and 
p2 < p2. The assignment of [ pl, p2] to a proposition p may be taken to mean that the 
degree of belief in p is pL1 and the degree of disbelief is p2. This presents one form of 
quantitative reasoning. Various other interesting complete lattices of truth values can 
similarly be discovered [22]. 
Future work may involve the study of the semantics of logic programs when 
our set of truth values forms a suitable kind of algebraic structure (other than 
a complete lattice). Recently, in [32], results on the semantics of logic programs 
over a pseudo-ring (a structure weaker than a ring) of truth values were 
derived. In particular, these results did not assume the set of truth values to 
be even partially ordered. However, these results were restricted to pure 
logic programs. The extension of these results to programs whose clauses 
may contain negated atoms in their bodies, and whose heads may be disjunctive, is 
still open. Likewise, logic programming over truth value spaces having different 
algebraic structures - e.g. post algebras, cylindrical algebras, etc., remain to be 
investigated. 
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